Interrupting an Akira intrusion after SonicWall VPN access at an Asia‑Pacific industrial manufacturer (August 2025)
At a glance
- Customer: IR‑1 subscriber — Asia‑Pacific industrial manufacturing company
- Environment: SonicWall SSL‑VPN, Windows domain controllers, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, firewall telemetry
- Attack type: VPN edge intrusion; credential dumping precursor activity; Akira‑aligned intrusion attempt
- Initial vector (assessed): SonicWall SSL‑VPN access (exact mechanism uncertain; zero‑day cannot be excluded)
- Blackpanda services: IR‑1 rapid response, incident triage, identity compromise assessment, containment guidance, recovery roadmap
CHALLENGE
A ransomware playbook in motion
The initial alert was not encryption — it was credential access on a domain controller. In manufacturing environments, this typically precedes lateral movement into backups, virtualisation platforms, and production‑critical systems.
The business risk was immediate:
- Loss of trust in Active Directory credentials
- High likelihood of ransomware deployment if the intrusion continued
- Operational downtime with downstream supply‑chain impact
SonicWall VPN under active threat pressure
Threat intelligence at the time showed a surge in Akira‑linked activity targeting SonicWall Gen 7 firewalls, including environments that were patched and had MFA enabled. Even without a confirmed zero‑day, the VPN had to be treated as a high‑risk entry point until proven otherwise.
SOLUTION
1. IR‑1 activation and rapid containment
With IR‑1 already in place (https://www.blackpanda.com/plans), Blackpanda responders mobilised without procurement delays. Immediate priorities were:
- Isolating affected domain controllers
- Restricting VPN access while preserving evidence
- Securing privileged credentials
2. Reconstructing the intrusion path
Blackpanda analysed endpoint, VPN, and firewall telemetry and identified:
- Initial access via the SonicWall SSL‑VPN
- Remote access into a domain controller
- Extensive Active Directory enumeration
- Command‑and‑control tunnelling consistent with Akira TTPs
3. Scope validation with proportional response
Blackpanda helped confirm whether compromise extended beyond the affected assets. The goal was to prevent overreaction while remaining conservative with security: contain fast, validate scope, and restore safely.
Evidence supported a constrained impact:
- Two domain controllers affected
- No evidence of additional systems compromised
- No ransomware encryption observed
4. Identity and VPN hardening
Blackpanda delivered targeted recommendations including:
- Temporary VPN lockdown and configuration review
- Credential rotation, including Kerberos krbtgt resets
- Monitoring for tunnelling and credential‑dumping activity
- Strengthening MFA and reducing exposed admin surfaces
RESULTS
Encryption avoided
The intrusion was disrupted before ransomware deployment, preventing operational downtime and data loss.
Clear scope for leadership
The company received an evidence‑based conclusion: two systems affected, no lateral spread beyond them, and no encryption.
Reduced repeat risk
The engagement resulted in stronger VPN controls and improved Active Directory hygiene — closing the most likely re‑entry paths used by Akira‑affiliated actors.
IR‑1 cost‑efficiency snapshot
Illustrative comparison (indicative only):
- IR‑1 subscription: 250 endpoints × USD 15 = USD 3,750 per year
- Comparable ad‑hoc IR: ~23 hours × USD 500/hour = USD 11,500
Under a traditional hourly model, this single incident exceeds the cost of annual IR‑1 coverage.
All prices are indicative and subject to change at any time.
FAQ: VPN Intrusions, Domain Controllers, and Akira‑Style Tradecraft
Q1. Why is NTDS.dit credential dumping so serious?
Because it can enable offline extraction and cracking of credential material, supporting privilege escalation and broader compromise.
Q2. Why are VPN appliances frequently targeted?
VPNs sit at the edge and can provide direct access into internal networks if exploited or if credentials are abused — often enabling rapid lateral movement.
Q3. Was there evidence of large‑scale data theft?
The report assessed limited outbound transfer volume and noted that while some system information may have been obtained, available evidence did not support large backup‑sized exfiltration.
Q4. What should we do immediately if a domain controller is suspected compromised?
Isolate affected systems, disable the suspected entry path, reset privileged credentials, reset krbtgt, and rebuild/restore systems to a known‑good state.
Q5. How does IR‑1 help in incidents like this?
It enables rapid mobilisation of incident responders to contain quickly, validate scope, and prevent costly overreaction or missed ransomware timing windows.
What this means for you
Ransomware rarely starts with encryption — it starts with access. If your organisation relies on VPN connectivity, early signals are your best chance to stop a full‑scale incident. With IR‑1, Blackpanda responders can step in immediately to contain threats before they become business‑stopping events.
